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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the United States and other western nations have
used pragmatic and theoretical reasons to justify a strong, global intellectual
property ("IP") regime. From a practical perspective, economically mature
nations clearly have a direct, vested interest in preventing the piracy
of patented goods and ensuring that their domestic agendas maximize
financial protection for inventions or creations.' Nevertheless, the
supranational disregard of patent protection and IP piracy has a financial
impact on numerous companies, as well as the taxpaying citizens, in
developed countries.2
The existence of philosophical differences between the traditional
European and American foundations for domestic IP rights leave the
rationale for recent international IP agreements somewhat hazy.3
Domestically, the United States has espoused the utilitarian theory in
enacting legislation granting various intellectual property rights.
Utilitarian theory posits that providing incentives for the creation of
goods serves the best interests of the nation, as it yields new products
and ideas that will ultimately maximize the citizens' welfare.4 By
contrast, European nations tend to justify intellectual property rights on
the basis of John Locke's theory of natural rights, which holds that
creators have a moral right to the product of their labor.5
These disparate foundations for basic IP rights result in a haphazard
theoretical grounding to the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS"), 6 the most prominent international IP
accord.7 While the intentions, and indeed many of the results, of the
1. BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING, GATI, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 121 (J.J. Norton ed., 1997).
2. Lee Petherbridge, Comment, Intelligent TRIPS Implementation: A Strategy for
Countries on the Cusp of Development, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1029, 1036 (2001);
Ruth Gana Okediji, Symposium on Globalization at the Margins: Perspectives on
Globalization from Developing States: Copyright and Public Welfare in Global
Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 121 (1999).
3. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of
Imperialism", 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (arguing that international IP
treaties appear to be based on a form of natural rights, rather than utilitarian theory).
4. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 2, 10-13 (3d ed. 2003).
5. Id. at 2-3.
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
7. See J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a
Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 370 (1996) [hereinafter Reichman,
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international IP protection regime under TRIPS have been positive, real
world economic concerns indicate the existence of moral dilemmas that
are yet to be resolved. International IP protection laws provide powerful
leverage in trade talks; though geared towards stimulating creativity,8
they also firmly protect the economic hegemony of the most developed
nations, perhaps at the expense of individual welfare-particularly
healthcare-in under-developed countries.
TRIPS is a powerful, comprehensive agreement, representing a positive
step for most trading nations. However, the agreement is haunted by the
bitter acrimony that surrounded its creation, the ongoing welfare issues
alluded to above, and a future that risks being derailed by an increasingly
important trading nation, China, which enjoys all the associated trade
benefits of TRIPS but does not endeavor to faithfully enforce IP regulations.
Part II of the paper describes the highly significant, yet often overlooked,
role of TRIPS' history in engendering animosity amongst many less-
developed nations. The strong-arm tactics of the developed world resulted
in the migration of primary international patent protection regime from
the auspices of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property ("Paris Convention") 9 to TRIPS, in the face of substantial
resistance from the least-developed countries.
Some of the critical structural aspects of TRIPS are examined in Part
II. Features included in TRIPS at the behest of developed nations often
appear to limit the self-determination of developing countries, and in
some instances, harm the welfare of the citizens of poorer countries, at
least in the short-term. Vague and often hotly contested accommodations
exist within TRIPS for the benefit of less developed nations in the event
of a health crisis. Greater clarity and certainty is required with respect to
this critical area of the agreement.
Part III considers the dynamics of the growing and maturing economy
in China, the world's second largest economic power.10 China presents a
Compliance] (arguing that TRIPS is not based on any "solid theoretical or empirical
foundations whatsoever").
8. Robert Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries,
37 IDEA 491, 492 (1997).
9. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_
wo02O.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
10. China's economic output is second largest behind that of the United States on
the basis of purchasing power parity. In spite of this, it is significant to note that it ranks
fascinating case study with respect to the dilemmas inherent in
international IP law. China simultaneously demonstrates qualities of
developed and developing countries. The tensions displayed in the response
of the Chinese government and administrative agencies to international
IP obligations imposed by TRIPS highlights the nontrivial problems
experienced by the pharmaceutical industries and ordinary citizens of
developing nations when such nations are forced to alter their traditional
business and social models to conform to the globally harmonized patent
system. Simultaneously, China's practice of exerting only minimal efforts
to enforce IP laws has, in a sense, been legitimized by its inclusion in
TRIPS, making a mockery of the painful sacrifices made by other
nations in complying with the treaty.
Lastly, Part IV proposes some modifications to the current international
IP regime. The proposals aim to establish a functioning IP regime that
rewards creativity, while simultaneously providing greater protection for
individuals' social and economic welfare, and not merely through perceived
benefits of "trickle-down" economics.11 With a few modest alterations
to TRIPS, these goals can be realized. Naturally, difficult concessions
would be required from all parties for this to be feasible. The role of
built-in review processes and the mechanisms by which TRIPS can be
modified are of critical importance. Additionally, the idea of increased
corporate responsibility and governance may be a wild-card factor in the
implementation of TRIPS in less-developed countries.
II. TRIPS FROM PARIS
A. The Demise of the Paris Convention
The United States is viewed by developing nations as the dominant
architect behind the establishment of the current intellectual property
protection regime, and history supports this interpretation. 12 The United
States did not always push aggressively for IP protection. Prior to the
1980s, trade and IP regulations operated independently of each other.
1 3
In general, the increasing importance of free-trade to the economic
far lower on a per capita basis. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2005 116 (2005), available
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.
11. William Greider, The Continuing Education of David Stocknan, ATLANTIC,
Dec. 1981, at 47 (using the term "trickle down" to describe Reagan's supply side economic
policy, which aimed to directly benefit the highest earners via tax cuts, indirectly
stimulating the entire economy) (available from author).
12. Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1029-30.
13. R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or
Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 226-26 (1989).
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growth of developed countries' economies has prompted increased
international protection of patents and other forms of intellectual property. 14
International intellectual property treatment began in earnest well over
a hundred years ago, with the drafting of the Paris Convention" in 1883.
Along with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works of 1886,16 the agreements were characterized by the
"unions" of nations that abided by them.17 In 1967, those early conventions
came under the administrative control of the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIIPO"), a specialized United Nations-operated agency.
18
The Paris Convention established nominal protection for patents and
trademarks by mandating equal "national treatment,"' 19 regardless of the
origin of the intellectual property, as well as the "right of priority., 20 At
the time of its adoption, the Paris Convention successfully fended off a
tide of anti-patent sentiment, much of which came from Germany.2 '
Interestingly, in that era the U.S. displayed little enthusiasm towards
22patents. Private ownership and the rights associated with patents were
14. See Randy L. Campbell, Global Patent Law Harmonization: Benefits and
Implementation, 13 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 605, 617 (2003) (noting importance of
international patent protection due to the elevated proportion of international trade in IP,
the increased interdependence of commerce, and problems associated with piracy of IP);
Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 393-94 (1996) [hereinafter Otten & Wager] (contemplating the
growing importance of international IP rights to the international trading system).
15. Paris Convention, supra note 9.
16. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of
September 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ berne/pdf/trtdocswoOO1.
pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
17. GRAENE B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 44 (2001).
18. World Intellectual Property Organization, opened for signature July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO]; WIPO was
formed in 1967, prior to which "BIRPI", the Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual
Property, was the primary intergovernmental body concerned with intellectual property.
See DINWOODIE, supra note 17, at 44. See also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 9 (2d ed. 2003).
19. See Paris Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(1). "Nationals of any country of the
Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all other countries
of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant... "
20. Id. arts. 4(A)(1), 4(C)(1).
21. DINWOODIE, supra note 17, at 378-79.
22. Sridhya Ragavan, Can't We All Get Along? The Case for a Workable Patent
Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 149 (2003) (Confusion over criteria for patentability
predominated, even after the enactment of the Patent Act in 1952. It was not until
Congress created the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over patent
appeals, that public attitudes began to change).
items on the American agenda.23 However, highly vigorous patent
protection was not sought by the United States or any other nation at that
time.
The Paris Convention ultimately failed to meet the needs of the modem
world due to its overly weak enforcement and resolution powers.24 For
instance, its dispute resolution mechanism relied on voluntary efforts
and compliance according to the United Nations Charter, rendering it
impotent in the face of serious disagreements.2 5 Some argue that the
United States bore some responsibility for this impasse by totally
abandoning the notion of using any resolution mechanisms involving the
International Court of Justice ("I.C.J."). 26 Though moot now, the United
States might have been able to build support for I.C.J. reform if they had
taken the time to send the I.C.J. a well-publicized test case involving a
clear violation of international IP laws.
In contrast to the United States, developing nations generally held
favorable opinions with respect to the Paris Convention and the WIPO
27administration. Much like the United Nations, in the 1970's most
28parties felt that WIPO was a relatively balanced, honest organization.
Developing nations increasingly used WIPO as a forum to lobby for
decreasing existing patent protections, arguing, amongst other things,
that IP represented "common heritage" that would be lost to foreign
interests.2 9 By the mid 1970's, this posture conflicted directly with the
United States' re-dedicated determination to strengthen IP protection.
30
23. DINWOODIE, supra note 17, at 382 (framing the United States' viewpoint in the
1870s that patents represented private property rights, unlike the Austrian practice of
treating patent rights more as a matter of public policy based on societal needs).
24. GERVAIS, supra note 18, at 1.10.
25. Robert J. Pechman, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property:
The United States "TRIPS" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 182-83 (1998).
26. Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough. Reasons to Strengthen
Intellectual Property Rights through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 271-72 (1998).
27. See Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 250 (1989).
28. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 20 (2003).
29. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 44 (Anthony D'Amato
& Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996).
30. Even though the Constitution unambiguously entrenches intellectual property
rights, IP rights have not always been accepted enthusiastically in the United States. See,
e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2004) [hereinafter
Helfer]. See also Gadbaw, supra note 13 n. 10 (listing main reasons for bullish sentiments
towards IP protection as the recognition of link between IP protection and trade,
globalization due to increased communications capabilities, increased piracy due to
technological advances, concerns arising from increased research, and development costs).
[VoL. 7: 523, 2006] TRIPS: Where Lies Its Future?
SAN DIEGO rNT'L L.J.
Deadlock developed under WIPO's equal vote membership. 31 Developed
nations, particularly the United States during the Reagan administration,
began to consider other options, including the development of a new
forum for IP rights. Many aspects of the transition of forums would
prove to be highly acrimonious and divisive, leading to fissures that still
exist today.
B. A New Playing Field. The Advantages of the WTO/GA TT
Forum to Developed Countries
Some developed nations instigated a new strategy of linking intellectual
property rights reform directly to trade policy in order to strengthen their
relative positions in the IP world/format arena.32 The United States and
Japan, in particular, sought to bring about a new paradigm in international
IP rights.33
Special interest groups were extremely important in bringing about the
transition to a new forum, with a number of lobbying groups within the
United States playing a very influential role.34 Arguably, the most important
group was the Intellectual Property Committee ("IPC"), 35 an American
group composed of a dozen corporate executives from the pharmaceutical,36
computer, and entertainment industries. The IPC played a pivotal role
in lobbying U.S. and foreign parties, and in drafting a document that was
ultimately brought to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")37 in 1988. The IPC believed that the integration of lP protection
with trade issues would be best accomplished in GATT as the primary
forum.
3 8 ,3 9
31. Helfer, supra note 30, at 20.
32. See Gadbaw, supra note 13, at 226.
33. GERVAIS, supra note 18, at 1.11.
34. See SELL, supra note 28, at 2.
35. Id. at 2 n. 1. In 1986, the IPC contained members from several pharmaceutical
and chemical companies, including ironically, Pfizer, as well as Merck, Bristol-Myers,
Johnson & Johnson, DuPont and Monsanto. Computer giants IBM and Hewlett-Packard
were represented, as were media companies CBS and General Electric (which was in the
midst of purchasing NBC in 1986), as well as General Motors, the world's largest car
manufacturer at that time.
36. Id.
37. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
38. GATT was formed in 1948 with the goal of increasing trade following World
War II and preventing a return of protectionism. SHAHID ALIKHAN & RAGHUNATH
MASHELKAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 41-42 (2004).
529
The timing was ripe with respect to the adoption of GATT-based IP
regulation. In a decade in which conservative administrations took the
reins in many western governments, 40 GATT bureaucrats had become all
too aware of changing politics, and risked being seen as irrelevant if they
expended excessive time dealing with North-South issues. 4 1,42 When the
opportunity to broaden GATT's scope arose amidst a very pro-trade
agenda at the Uruguay Round, the response from the GATT Secretariat
was predictably favorable.43
The linkage of trade and intellectual property issues provided developed
nations with the simple, yet effective, enforcement mechanism they sorely
lacked under WIPO: the ability to impose tariffs or trade sanctions,
within the rules of the organization, as a penalty for IP violations by
another member. In the 1970s the United States, had, for example, enacted
domestic legislation that provided potentially significant firepower
towards nations that did not respect U.S. IP rights. Section 301 of the U.S.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988("Omnibus Trade Act")
44
(frequently referred to as either "Special 301" or "Super 301 ,)45 and Section
39. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1371 (1987).
40. See SELL, supra note 28, at 19.
41. Id. at 20.
42. "North-South" designates the division between "developed" countries, whose
mature manufacturing and technology sectors form a significant portion of the economy,
and "developing" countries, which are more reliant on manufacturing, as they try to
narrow the economic gap with developed countries. See Canada-France-Federal
Republic of Germany-Italy-Japan-United Kingdom-United States: London Summit Final
Communiqu6 on North-South Issues, Energy and Economic Cooperation, 16 I.L.M. 724
(1977) for a general outline of issues relating to developing countries.
43. See SELL, supra note 28, at 20.
44. See Alejandro Lopez-Velarde, Trademarks in Mexico: The Effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49 n.249 (1994) (discussing the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988).
45. There is a oft-missed distinction between "Special 301" and "Super 301"
actions. The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 created Section 301 as a statutory mechanism by
which the United States enforces international trade regulations. Under "Special 301"
powers, countries identified by the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") as not adequately
protecting U.S. IP interests were placed into one of three designated categories: Priority
Foreign Country, Priority Watch List, and Watch List. The former group was subject to
the most stringent probing by the United States. Legislative changes to Section 301, via
Section 1302 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, resulted in the
"Super 301" provision. This proactive legislation required the USTR to identify
"priority foreign country practices that if eliminated, would most benefit exports. Failure
to offer market access leads to intergovernmental negotiations, and if those are
unsuccessful, the United States takes the alleged offender to task under Section 301,
generally using the WTO Dispute Resolution process. "Super 301" power has expired
several times but it has been reinstated and is currently in force. See Kenneth J. Ashman,
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: the Section 301 amendments,
7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 115, 121 (1989) (Section 301 amendment considered a protectionist
countermeasure, originally conceived to fend off the perceived trade threat from Japan;
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337 of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1930, as modified by the Omnibus
Trade Act, empowered, and virtually mandated, the President and United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") to retaliate against countries that
failed to control identified breaches of intellectual property or other
improper trade practices.46
Developing countries objected to the linkage of intellectual property
protection with trade law.47 GATT's voting convention differed from
that of WIPO, though. Voting at GATT only takes place after a consensus
had been reached, and consensus was expected. This meant, effectively,
that unless the opposition to a draft was significant, any dissenting
nations would be pressured to quickly line up with the others. Clearly
the divide between nations was not great enough to prevent a new draft
mandate concerning IP, particularly with the ever-present threat of U.S.
sanctions looming under Section 301 .48 Intimidation through legislation
appeared to work. Consequently, the nations agreed to pursue a
comprehensive IP rights agreement at the 1986 Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.4 9
In its final draft, the TRIPS Agreement outlined mechanisms for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights5 ° and the resolution of disputes5I
that far exceeded those available under the Paris Convention. TRIPS
implemented GATT's highly detailed Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU"), which pre-dated the formation of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") and the Uruguay Round. 2 Countries could, in theory, be held
accountable for their trade behavior and IP violations, risking retaliatory
measures if they failed to respond to rulings.53 Of course, in addition to
structurally, the removal of Presidential discretion prior to action against improper
international trade practices is quite significant).
46. Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some
Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 301, 301 (1990).
47. Warren Newberry, Copyright Reform in China: A "TRIPS" Much Shorter and
Less Strange than Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1425, 1430 (2003) (noting how linkage
of intellectual property with trade at GATT would lead to more readily available
sanctions).
48. SELL, supra note 28, at 109-10.
49. SODIPO, supra note 1, at 24-25.
50. TRIPS, supra note 6, pt. III.
51. Id. pt.V.
52. Id. art. 64.
53. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec.
15, 1993 Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round [hereinafter DSU],
available at http://www.wto.org/English/docse/04-wto.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
GATT's dispute resolution process, the United States maintained its
prerogative to take Special 301 action when dissatisfied with a
WTO/GATT ruling.54
Additionally, GATT provided the United States and other developed
nations with a highly favorable environment for negotiations. Within the
confines of GATT, bargaining strength was correlated with a nation's
relative economic power. Consequently, developing countries no longer
had equal footing with larger powers-a clear shift from the more
egalitarian, United Nations-based, WIPOf 6 The bargaining power of
developed countries at GATT/WTO was further enhanced by those
countries' ability to leverage market access in trade negotiations with
developing countries.57
The preliminary negotiations leading up to the TRIPS agreement did
little to placate developing nations. The multiple rounds of negotiations
and committee meetings that took place in order to reach agreement on
the ground rules for IP protection were quite divisive. 58 Developing
countries were justified in the belief that developed nations actively co-
plotted strategies in advance of the official negotiating sessions. To
illustrate, at a meeting of the Geneva session in May 1990, a European
Community proposal entitled "Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights" was followed shortly by a similar
proposal from the United States, bearing the same name and very similar
contents. 59 Behind the scenes meetings of decision-makers have become
an institution now at WTO meetings. "Green Room" meetings of select
nations at WTO Ministerial Conferences suggests a two tier culture.6 °
54. SELL, supra note 28, at 118-19.
55. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GA TTI/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 341 (2002).
56. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Jul. 14,
1967, 27 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
57. Helfer, supra note 30, at 21.
58. But see id. at 4. Helfer argues that the current perspective of non-governmental
organizations regarding the negotiations leading to the adoption of TRIPS represents
revisionist readings of... negotiating history."
59. The EC proposal is available as MTN.GNG/NG11 /W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990). The
United States proposal is MTN.GNG/NG I l/W/70. See GERVAIS, supra note 18, 1.18
(comparing draft proposal on intellectual property rights by the EC and United States).
60. See, e.g., WTO Briefing Note-Committee of the Whole (Dec. 1, 1999), at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/minist-e/min99_e/English/aboute/resumeO1_e.ht
ml (last visited Apr. 7, 2006) (noting on official WTO website, that at the onset of the
3rd Ministerial Meeting of WTO in Seattle, U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky
openly mentioned that she "reserved the right to hold Green Room meetings" in spite of
her preference for more inclusive, Working Groups of delegates). See also Aileen Kwa,
Lamy's Rule-Less Negotiating Procedures Work Against the Weak (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://www.focusweb.org/content/view/865/36/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006) (Pro-south
organization discusses the implications of a last minute statement by WTO Director
General that he might require ministerial involvement at an upcoming meeting in
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After numerous bargaining sessions, frequently divided along the lines
of developmental status or regional market concerns,61 the new IP
protection agreement, TRIPS, was opened for signing at the Marrakesh
Meeting of Trade Ministers.62 One hundred and fourteen contracting
parties became subject to TRIPS at that time.63 The stated mission
of TRIPS was to "reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade.. ." through "adequate protection of intellectual property rights. 64
TRIPS established standards and norms for patents and six other forms
of IP.
65
The basal protection provided by TRIPS represents far more stringent
coverage than that of the Paris and Berne Conventions,66 precisely what
the United States and other developed nations sought. Nonetheless,
some scholars considered its patent protection excessively lenient.67 But
stronger patent protection had been anticipated by TRIPS, and it
explicitly allows member nations to establish stronger domestic IP
protections than that defined within the Agreement.6 8 Nor does TRIPS
prevent the establishment of bilateral or regional treaties containing
stronger IP protections. The United States has pursued many such
agreements subsequent to TRIPS.69
Geneva. Concludes that countries without ministers or Green Room invitations might
effectively be omitted from all negotiations).
61. Id. at 1.27-1.32 (discussing a variety of late hurdles, including: geographical
marking concerns for European wine growers; some South American countries' desire to
include moral rights for copyrights; objections by U.S. pharmaceuticals to the incorporation
of a transitional period for compliance; and India's strong desire for the availability of
compulsory licensing).
62. TRIPS, supra note 6.
63. There are 149 WTO members. They must abide by all WTO agreements,
including TRIPS. "Observer" status nations are expected to become members. This
includes Russia, Iraq and others. See World Trade Organization, Organization Members
and Observer Governments, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/
tif e/org6_e.htm http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
64. TRIPS, supra note 6, pmbl.
65. IP rights protected by TRIPS include patents and copyrights, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, integrated circuit schematics, and trade
secrets. See TRIPS Part II.
66. Otten & Wager, supra note 14, at 396-97.
67. See Sherwood, supra note 8, at 494-95 (reporting that level of patent protection
adopted by developing countries on the basis of TRIPS may not be "robust", defined as
the level necessary to stimulate investment).
68. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1(1).
69. Peter Drahos, The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement (May 20-21,
2005) (unpublished manuscript for the workshop on "WTO Dispute Settlement and
C. Substantive Features of TRIPS Relevant to Developing Nations
Textually, the TRIPS Agreement commences in a straightforward
manner, proclaiming in its mission statement, that it desires "to reduce
distortions and impediments to trade." The Preamble also states that the
Agreement aims to prevent IP protective measures from becoming
barriers to legitimate trade.70 Although at a superficial level this text
seems benign, it is perhaps somewhat misleading with regards to IP not
affecting "legitimate" trade. Strictly speaking, given the fact that a patent is
a governmentally-issued, exclusive property right,7' there are few
structural constraints that could be imposed which would have a greater
protectionist effect on trade.
TRIPS entails various norms and standards, including subject matter,
available rights, the term of protection and exceptions, and mandates that
patents must be available "without discrimination as to the place of
invention. 7 2 In defining these standards, TRIPS incorporated aspects
of previous conventions-including most of the Berne and Paris
Conventions-into the complete, extended agreement. 73 The additional
elements superimposed on those earlier agreements has led many to call
TRIPS the "Berne-plus and Paris-plus agreement.,
74
D. Issues Associated with the Breadth of TRIPS
Unlike the treatment afforded patent rights under the Paris Convention,
75
Article 27 of TRIPS broadly holds that patents are to be "available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology. 76
This extended scope of patentability marked a clear victory for the
United States and some of the other developed nations, and a defeat for
the developing countries which sought to exercise some control over
domestic patents.77 Exclusions from the mandatory patent requirements
Developing Countries: Use, Implications, Strategies, Reforms", Univ. of Wisconsin,
Madison) (on file with the author).
70. TRIPS, supra note 6, pmbl.
71. Adam Isaac Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations:
The Quest for World Patent Law Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 373,
375 (2002).
72. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27(1).
73. Otten & Wager, supra note 14, at 396-97.
74. Id. at 397.
75. See generally Paris Convention, supra note 9 (permitting member states to
limit patentable subject matter at their discretion, provided rules applied non-
discriminatorily).
76. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27(1).
77. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round:
Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market,
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may be made by countries in only a few limited categories. By contrast,
under the Paris Convention, decisions on IP strength were made
individually by member nations. The only requirement for nations was
"national treatment"-there could be no distinction made on the basis of
foreign or domestic markets when applying the rules.78 Under TRIPS,
exclusion from patentability can be invoked under Article 27 where
preventing commercial exploitation is necessary to protect public order
or morality, "including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or
to avoid serious prejudice to the environment." 79 Additionally, "diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans" may be
excluded from patentability.8 ° TRIPS had recognized health issues, but
the vague wording would give rise to much debate.
The influence of the IPC, and particularly of its pharmaceutical and
computer industry executives, was most likely responsible for the
inclusion of other industry-friendly, intellectual property components in
TRIPS. For example, Section 7, Article 39 of TRIPS dealt with trade
secrets, making it the first multilateral agreement to provide full
protection to trade secrets. 81 Brief in its wording and basic in its scope,
Article 39 can be hardly considered provocative or controversial by any
12particular nation or group. The inclusion of trade secret protection in
TRIPS was foreshadowed by the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), 83 a regional, trilateral settlement signed one year earlier• 84
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. From a policy
standpoint, trade secret protection, referred to in Section 7 as "undisclosed
information," appears geared squarely towards maintaining the confidentiality
4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 182 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman,
TRIPS Component].
78. See Evelyn Su, Comment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing
Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 169, 179-80 (2000).
79. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27(2).
80. Id art 27(3)(a).
81. Id. art. 39.
82. See Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 77, at 235-38 (taking a positive
outlook on what was then still only potential trade secret inclusion in TRIPS).
83. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992 [hereinafter NAFTA],
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
84. See DINWOODIE, supra note 17, at 563. NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement are
highly similar. NAFTA, though signed in 1993, was actually modeled on the backbone
of an early TRIPS draft.
of regulatory filings, a major concern of the influential pharmaceutical
industry.
85
Concomitantly, healthcare issues are given very brief treatment in the
original TRIPS agreement, which is astounding given the enormity of
the treaty's scope.8 6 Heavy profiteering by GlaxoSmithKline in its sales
of AIDS medication to developing countries led to heavy criticism of the
big pharmaceutical companies, and increased efforts to provide access to
generics to fill a much needed void.
87
III. CHINA'S PUBLIC EMBRACE OF THE WTO AND TRIPS
Small developing countries had little choice but to join TRIPS in order
to gain market access and financial stability. 88 China, however, did not
fit into this category. While China coveted increased trade and investment
revenues, the United States and western nations desired increased
compliance and assistance from China with respect to piracy and
counterfeiting issues.
89
A. Can a Tradition of IP Rights Ever Flourish in China?
In recent years, there has been an unprecedented growth of commerce
between the Republic of China and the world at large. Nevertheless,
several recent high profile patent court decisions, as well as the virtually
unabated piracy of copyrighted materials, have raised doubts about the
resolve of the Chinese government to adopt the standards of international
IP protection mandated by TRIPS. Pharmaceutical interests and other
supporters of strong IP rights took umbrage with a Chinese
administrative court ruling in July 2004. The occasion was a dramatic
ruling from a review board in China's State Intellectual Property Office
85. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 39(3). See also GERVAIS, supra note 18, at 2.355
(protecting confidential information for industries needing regulatory market approval).
86. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27.
87. See Sitaraman Shankar & Ben Hirschler, Indian Firm Aids Cocktail for $1 a
Day, Common Dreams News Center (Feb. 7, 2001) http://www.commondreams.org/
headlinesOl/0207-03.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (The article illustrates how an Indian
generic manufacturer, Cipla, was able to drastically undercut the GlaxoSmithKline's
prices. This likely pressured Glaxo and other firms to cut prices so as to avoid totally
losing market share and receiving further embarrassing publicity); see also Rosie
Murray-West, Glaxo cuts price of Aids treatment, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 28, 2004, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2003/04/28/cnglax28.xml (last visited
Jan. 9, 2006) (providing specifics on price reductions).
88. TRIPS, supra note 6.
89. See SELL, supra note 28, at 45 (discussing the IPC lobbying the U.S.
government to crack down on foreign piracy).
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("SIPO"), 90 issued in response to a petition from twelve domestic
Chinese pharmaceutical companies. 91 These companies had appealed the
Chinese patent granted to Pfizer,92 the American-based pharmaceutical
behemoth, for the drug Viagra in 2001. At the time, Viagra was patented
throughout the world. It has been suggested that SIPO's Patent
Reexamination Board sympathized with the domestic manufacturers,
and declared that the patent previously granted to Pfizer for Viagra had
indeed failed to satisfy certain patent law requirements.93
Specific details regarding the board's decision have been somewhat
scarce, but the rationale can be summarized by two legal theories. Some
statements indicated that the board found Viagra's chemically active
ingredient, sildenafil citrate,94 had failed to satisfy the novelty requirement
under China's patent law.95 Others reported that the revocation of the
patent resulted from a breach of Article 26 of Chinese patent law, due
to Pfizer's failure to accurately and sufficiently describe Viagra's
90. The Chinese government created SIPO in 1998, to regulate intergovernmental
IP concerns and international compliance. Newberry, supra note 47, at 1444.
91. See China Defends Decision to Ignore Viagra Patent, THE EPOCH TIMEs, Jul.
17, 2004, http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-7-17/22377.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2006) (China defends its decision to invalidate Viagra patent); Form 8-K, Third-Quarter
2004 Performance Report for Pfizer, Exhibit No. 99 Press Release (Oct. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.pfizer.com/download/investors/financial/8k_1020_04.pdf (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006) (Pfizer promises to "vigorously appeal" Viagra patent loss).
92. The world's largest pharmaceutical firm, Pfizer's 2003 sales exceeded $45
billion. Viagra generated almost $1.9 billion in sales. 2004 Annual Financial Report 7,
available at http://www.pfizer.com/are/investorsreports/annual_2003/financial2003.pdf (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006); Nicholas Zamiska & Heather Won Tesoriero, As Pfizer Battles
Fakes in China, Nation's Police Are Uneasy Allies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at Al
(though the Viagra patent remains "in force" pending appeal, Chinese counterfeiters
argue that it is no longer illegal to make Viagra).
93. See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 2, 22, translated in
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish/flfg/zlflfg/t2002O327_33872.htm (last visited Jan.
9, 2006) [hereinafter Patent Law] (the requirements of "invention" patents in China are
novelty, inventiveness and practicality).
94. Sildenafil citrate was first developed and prescribed as a treatment for angina,
not erectile dysfunction, in 1991. See Sildenafil Citrate, HealthAtoZ, available at http://
www.healthatoz.com/healthatoz/Atoz/ency/sildenafil-citrate.jsp (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
95. "Novelty" is defined as "before the date of filing, no identical invention or
utility model has been publicly disclosed in publications in the country or abroad or has
been publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country, nor
has any other person filed previously with the patent office an application which
described the identical invention or utility model and was published after the said date of
filing." See Patent Law, supra note 93, art. 22.
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manufacturing process.96 Either way, the enigmatic revocation of
Pfizer's patent by SIPO is fairly representative of unresolved tensions
with respect to the protection of international IP rights by China. In
May, 2004, only two months prior to SIPO's decision to invalidate the
Viagra patent, there was moderate fanfare surrounding the signing of an
agreement between Pfizer and the Chinese government to enforce intellectual
property rights and counter acts of piracy, indicating the dualities present
in Chinese culture. 97 China is a prime illustration of the dynamics and
pitfalls inherent to the protection of international intellectual property
rights.
The relatively soft treatment of China by the WTO is a prime illustration
of hypocrisy. China has publicly supported free trade, and has also
displayed some support for the regulation of intellectual property. On
December 11, 2001, China achieved its goal and became a contracting
party to the WTO. Given the multilateral nature of the WTO, China also
had to sign TRIPS.98 China has implemented the necessary legislative
changes prescribed under TRIPS. China was able to accomplish this by
enacting the Trademark Law in 1982, Patent Law in 1984, Copyright
Law in 1990, and others. 99 China also joined WIPO in 1980, one year
after it began opening its marketplace to the rest of the world. 0
China's entry into the WTO was not without controversy and resulted
in some targeted opposition from the United States.' 0' China availed
itself of WTO regulations permitting a signatory nation to designate
itself as a developing nation, a tactic that drew much criticism, but
provided China with a longer transition window for full compliance with
96. Those seeking patent protection for an invention must offer a description
sufficiently clear so as to allow a person skilled in the relevant field to understand the
drug. See Guo Nei, Authorities: Viagra Patent Found Invalid, CHINA DAfLY, Jul. 7, 2004,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/09/content_346766,htm
(last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
97. Press Release, Pfizer Inc., Pfizer Signs Agreement with Chinese Government
to Enhance Protection of Patents (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.pfizer.
com/are/newsreleases/2004pr/mn 2004 0518.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (detailing
cooperative pact between parties on a Pfizer new release, specifically mentioning illegal
Viagra production in China).
98. See supra note 63.
99. Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Ascension, Film Piracy
and Prospects for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 389, 390
(2002). But cf Zhou Chuanjie, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 12
Lov. L.A. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 68 (1989) (providing an extremely positive, early
assessment of China's progress with respect to patent protection, from a Chinese
attorney).
100. Weqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 63, 69-70
(discussing steps taken by China to integrate into trading community).
101. Id. at 94.
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TRIPS.10 2 However, this was not a surprise to some, as China has always
been a shrewd negotiator.
10
3
Still, China is the source for billions of dollars in counterfeit goods,
particularly ones in violation of copyright laws.' 0 4  Given that these
breaches have gone relatively unchecked in spite of strenuous complaints
from the powerful entertainment lobby, China's enforcement of IP law
in other industries is highly suspect.10 5 An observer put the situation into
perspective perfectly by laughing at the Chinese government's claims
that it can not control piracy by imagining how quickly the factory
manager would be thrown in jail if the factory distributed copies of a
BBC special on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and violence.
0 6
The SIPO review board's decision concerning the Pfizer Viagra patent
("Pfizer") may well portend weak protection of foreign patents,
particularly in the pharmaceutical industry. It is hard to know to what
extent protectionist factions have permeated SIPO. The Viagra decision
might, after all, be based on a sincere legal analysis of the claim's novelty.
Yet it is equally possible that this decision is symptomatic of the
fundamental nature of China's legal culture and its lack of IP tradition.'0 7
Some commentators have suggested that China's fundamentally
different interpretation of the "rule of law" and deeply-rooted basis in
Confucian ideology represents a significant roadblock in its acceptance
of the primacy of IP rights.10 8 China's historically stable society can be
primarily attributed to the influence of Confucius, over 1500 years ago.'09
102. See China and the WTO: Issues and Debates, available at http://www.
globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/china/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (collection of links
relating to problems encountered as China prepared to join the WTO).
103. From a business perspective, China's strategy was smart. It maintained its
position that it was a developing country, and consequently emerged from the
proceedings with the maximum statutory leeway with respect to the timetable for fully
implementing TRIPS.
104. Yonehara, supra note 99, at 392-93.
105. See, e.g., Neil King Jr., Stuck on You: A Tiny Glue Seller Claims Identity Theft,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at Al.
106. Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY.
L.A. INT'L. & Comp. L. REv. 127, 141-42 (2003) (arguing that Chinese government
encourages piracy through its extremely aggressive censorship of media, which leads to
black market distribution of goods to a wide segment of the population).
107. David W. Clark, The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law, in LAW, CAPITALISM
AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 28, 35-36 (Kanishka
Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
108. Yonehara, supra note 99, at 398-400.
109. H. PATRICK GLENN, An Asian Legal Tradition: Make It New (With Marx?), in
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 301, 304-06 (2d ed. 2004).
Confucius attached strong significance to li, a collectivist philosophy
that emphasizes the primacy of moral and social roles in conflict
management. 10 Conversely, legal institutions and criminal law had little
importance to Confucius." They fall under the auspices of the concept
of fa. Fa is seen as representing individual actions, not collective ones.
Less credence is given, therefore, to the rights of original creators of
goods.'1 2 Further complicating the situation is the fact that copying has
been traditionally a highly respected component to the artistic process in
China.1 3 Communism in China, particularly during the Mao Zedong era,
114
generated attitudes which sharply contrast with personal profiteering." 
5
Significantly, some scholars reject the notion that China's cultural
differences account for its failure to accede to the intellectual property
rights regime." 6  They argue that, although traditional practices and
beliefs might run counter to the spirit of IP legislation, this has hardly
prevented the development of Chinese laws protecting IP rights.' '17 This
ignores or at least downplays the fact that China is clearly motivated to
enact IP laws. That has very little connection with enforcing those laws.
The author believes that legislation does not always necessarily
represent the intent or sentiments of the people or politicians. Legislation,
on both the national or international level, frequently develops from any
number of sophisticated strategic or pragmatic reasons. The enactment
of domestic IP legislation in China may well be part of a systematic
strategy designed to ease China into various trading pacts, such as the
WTO and the coveted most favored nation ("MFN") status (now
officially referred to as "normal trade relation", or "NTR" status).
Despite factors which limit natural acceptance of IP rights, China does
have a history of enacting laws and engaging in intellectual property
treaties, albeit under the strong influence of the United States. In 1903,
under U.S. pressure, pre-communist China signed a bilateral treaty for
reciprocal protection of intellectual property with the United States." 8
China joined the WIPO in 1980, instituted its own trademark law in
1982, a patent statute in 1984, entered into the Paris Convention in 1985,
110. Id. at 304-05.
111. Id. at 305-06.
112. Yonehara, supra note 99, at 401.
113. Id.
114. Mao was the Chairman of the Communist Party of the People's Republic of
China from its inception in 1949 to his death in 1976.
115. Yonehara, supra note 99, at 401.
116. Peter K. Yu, Four Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 127, 131-32 (2003).
117. Id. at 113.
118. Newberry, supra note 47, at 1436.
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and passed copyright legislation in 1990.119 Despite these efforts, a lack
of enforcement led to U.S. threats of Special 301 retaliation, revocation
of China's most favored nation status, and blockage of China's bid to
join the WTO. 120 This pressure resulted in the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding on Intellectual Property [hereinafter "MOU"] between
the two nations in 1992, which subsequently obliged China to enter into
the Berne and Geneva Conventions, and to revise its copyright laws. 1
21
China's reluctant support of strong IP regulations should not be
confused with its desire for strengthened trade, which was its impetus for
joining the WTO. l2 2 With a population of 1.3 billion people,12 China's
economic stability is of paramount importance to the hegemony of the
Communist Party. China's economy has changed over the past two
decades, as charted by Deng Xiaoping. 124 Deng's "open door" policy
brought Chinese laws-if not practices-closer to those of the West
with respect to economic matters. 125 While still officially committed
to Communism, China has increasingly encouraged capitalist ventures,
even via official governmental youth organizations.
126
Internal conflict over the implementation of international IP regulations is
not unique to China. TRIPS provides the blueprint for harmonizing global
minimum national IP standards, 127 and as such, controversy has arisen
between the interests of developed, developing, and under-developed
nations. India, for example, vigorously debated TRIPS and recently ceded
to a TRIPS-mandated deadline of January 1, 2005 for modifying the
Indian Patents Act to provide enhanced protection for pharmaceuticals,
food, and chemicals.
128
119. Id. at 1438-39.
120. Id. at 1439.
121. Id.
122. Yonehara, supra note 99, at 390.
123. See THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 10, at 115 (China has an estimated
population of 1,306,313,812).
124. Yonehara, supra note 99, at 402.
125. Laurence P. Harrington, Recent Amendments to China's Patent Law: The
Emperor's New Clothes, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 337, 343 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, Chinese Youth League Turns New Path:
Madison Avenue, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at Al (Communist Youth League teaching
capitalism across China); Steven Gray & Geoffirey A. Fowler, China's New Entrepreneurs,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at BI (American business models embraced by franchisees,
particularly in a growing restaurant industry that produce an astounding $90 billion in
sales in 2005).
127. TRIPS, supra note 6.
128. See ICTSD, Indian TRIPS-Compliance Legislation Under Fire, 9(1) BRIDGES
Activists concerned with global trade inequities have argued that
TRIPS protects corporate interests at the expense of individual
welfare. 9 Indeed, while increased investment should almost certainly
generate improvements in developing nations' infrastructure, it won't
preclude the negative effects of corruption at the state level, which will
be more likely in some countries than others.
B. Risks Associated with China's Inflated Economy
The undeniably large piracy issue in China has been one of the
primary forces driving the western desire for increased IP protection in
China and other parts of Asia. 130 In response, China has publicly stated
that it supports increased IP protection to avoid a repeat of its loss of
direct Japanese investment in the 1990s.1'3 Notwithstanding its weak IP
protection, the growth of the Chinese economy, combined with a cheap,
educated labor force ensures that western nations can't afford to turn
their backs on China's marketplace. 1
32
Again, the main reason for China's official support for TRIPS rests in
the accompanying trade benefits from GATT membership. Being privy
to the WTO and GATT provides China with the greatest prize: clear
access to the global market. However, unlike earlier trade forums, its
inclusion as a full partner in TRIPS/WTO is not linked to humanitarian
and human rights issues.
Economic development in China is flourishing, with growth at record
levels.' 33 Astoundingly, China now accounts for one-quarter of the world's
WEEKLY DIGEST, Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-01-19/story2.htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006).
129. See, e.g., WTO nears deal amid protests, CNN (online), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/12/17/wto.protests/index.html (last visited Apr.
17, 2006) (discussing the December 2005 round in Hong Kong); Arrests in Montreal
anti-WTO Protests, CBC NEWSWORLD, July 28, 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/
07/28/wto_protestsO30728 (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (discussing the Montreal protests);
see generally Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle,
17 ARIz. J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 257 (2000) (discussing the Seattle protests).
130. Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade
Secret Protection Decisions for the Multinational Corporation in China, 11 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 437, 484 (2004).
131. Newberry, supra note 47, at 1450.
132. See Zamiska, supra note 92 (consider Pfizer, fighting to revive its Viagra
patent and struggling to induce a Chinese response against counterfeiters, yet carrying on
business as normal).
133. Retail Data Suggests Balanced Growth for China, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2004,
at A22 [hereinafter Retail Data] (annual economic growth rate in China currently at more
than 9 percent); China Stresses Need to Develop Capital Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2005, at AlO [hereinafter Capital Markets] (tax director states that China's economy
grew by an inflation-adjusted 9.2% in 2004, virtually identical to its 9.3% estimated
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growth. Urban centers in China have undergone unprecedented growth
in the past decade and retail sales are booming. 13 4 Foreign investors
enjoy the benefits of the currently booming Chinese economy. 135 They
have access to a comparatively cheap labor force, a growing supply of
engineers and other professionals, favorable tax concessions, a rich
supply of commodities, and a marketplace that can now afford to
purchase more expensive products that would have been destined for
export to the West only a few years ago.
Still, the rapidly expanding Chinese economy provides reason for
some concern. No economy can sustain such a record of maximal growth
rates indefinitely in a competitive global marketplace. Economies move
in cycles. The burden of managing an economy amidst intense growth is
difficult, and former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan
expressed concerns about China's growth rate.' 36 Although, controlling
interest rates and the monetary supplies can prevent excessive inflation
and permit stable, less punctuated growth, the actions of a central bank
can only limit damage to a degree. Tough decisions lie ahead for China,
especially since some strong political forces in the United States demand
that it free its currency from its valuation tie with the U.S. dollar.
37
The head of the Central Bank in China, Zhou Xiaochuan, is aware of
the difficulties and dangers of China's current economic growth and has
commented on the need for a maturation of the corporate financing
system in China. 38 Recognizing a potential problem, however, is but
one step in an overall solution: it remains to be seen whether Zhou will
be able to stay ahead of the curve and keep inflationary pressures under
control. In recent years, rapid growth has brought much wealth into
selected areas of China. Consequently, there are a limited number of moves
growth the previous year. Accounting for inflation, the growth rate would rise to
approximately 15%.).
134. See Retail Data, supra note 133 (suggesting balanced growth for China).
135. Id. (noting foreign direct investment increased by over 23 percent).
136. Greenspan: China's economy may be overheating, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE
(English ed.), Apr. 22, 2004, available at http://english.people.com.cn/other/archive.html
(follow "Year 2004: April" hyperlink; then follow "April 22, 2004" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 17, 2006).
137. John H. Makin, Opinion, For a Few Dollars More, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2004,
at A22.
138. See Capital Markets, supra note 133. Zhou frequently makes well-nuanced
remarks to prevent strong marketplace corrections. Cf U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan, famously speaking of "irrational exuberance" in the marketplace,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/19961205.htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2006).
that Zhou can take to counter the economy's momentum, particularly
since its currency is artificially "pegged" to the value of the U.S. dollar,
rather than on the basis of Chinese market conditions.
An additional concern during any economic downturn is the increased
number of loan defaults, which can cause serious harm to a nation's
banking infrastructure. 139 Improperly issued loans, fraudulent collateral,
and a general lack of banking experience can cause this phenomenon.
Internal corruption can compound the potential damages of loan default.
Significantly, there already exist indications that China has internal
problems with its banking system. Most recently, the chairman of China's
largest real estate bank, the China Construction Bank, resigned amidst a
corruption probe.1
40
It is difficult to make accurate long-term economic predictions. China
might emerge from this economic cycle unscathed without undergoing
any drastic corrections. Nevertheless, it would be troubling if developed
nations enjoyed the fruits of the Chinese economy without appropriate
consideration for the hundreds of millions of rural Chinese inhabitants,
many of whom do not have access to running water. Some estimates
suggest that there could be more than one hundred million farmers
without full-time employment, many of them leading a nomadic
existence in search of work.' 41 If a country of this size does undergo a
large-scale recession, the consequences to the population could be severe
and dramatic. Could the Chinese government afford to expend vast sums of
money to feed its population? Would doing so only deepen the financial
problems? Would the central government instead leave these decisions
and tasks to the rural collectives that currently do much of the day-to-
day governing? Would the Chinese government admit to a crisis if one
existed?
Unfortunately, governments do not always act in the best interests of
their citizens. While developed nations cannot be expected to repress
their economic competitiveness, they must be mindful of the consequences,
particularly when dealing with other nations with relatively disenfianchised
citizens. 142 It is not overly idealistic to demand a higher level of ethics
139. China's banking system is set up with several tiers of loans and loaning
institutions. A potential problem lies with State Operated Enterprises (SOE) that
typically lose large sums of money. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The People's Bank
of China, in CHINA AND HONG KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION, COMMERCIAL AND
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 81, 82 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., 2000).
140. Andrew Browne & Kate Linebaugh, Corruption Probe Clouds Chinese Banks'
IPO Plans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at A23, available at http://chinascope.
org/en/newsdetailp.php?id= 1244 (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
141. THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 10, at 116.
142. See Klinton W. Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case
for Violating Yugoslavia's Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22
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from the world's stronger trade partners. These goals can be manifested
through government advisory panels on acceptable corporate trade
practices, sanctions against firms that breach good trade practices in
foreign countries, and the opportunity to earn tax credits for outstanding
corporate behavior, particularly where it involved a sacrifice.
IV. A SEARCH FOR ANSWERS: PARADIGMS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY THEORY REVISITED
A. TRIPS Needs Strong Safeguards to Protect Poorer Populations
and Provide for Long-Term Growth Prospects
The utilitarian philosophy at the heart of U.S. IP policy is explicitly
expressed in the Constitution.1 43  The underpinnings of IP rights in
European countries, by contrast, rise largely from the Lockean "natural
rights" belief that an individual is morally entitled to the product of his
labor.144  These incentive and reward-based theories represent highly
idealized perspectives and are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to
explain the adoption of IP rights by many nations. Though the philosophies
may justify much of the IP protection in the developed world, they
hardly suggest the same potential payout to under-developed and
developing nations.
Disregard for nations' historical differences is a significant roadblock
to equity in P law. Though extrapolation can lead to inaccurate predictions,
it should be noted that most developed nations with strong, domestic IP
traditions took well over a century before these regimes became
entrenched. 145 Under TRIPS, developing countries struggling to build
their own economic infrastructures in the wake of colonial era institutions
have a finite time period in which to comply with detailed trade and IP
restrictions.1
46
Hous. J. INT'L. L. 403, 406 (2000) (portraying the decision by the United States and
NATO to intervene in Kosovo for humanitarian purposes as indicative of the "emerging
norm in international law," whereby the global community does not passively tolerate
violations of citizens' human rights by their government).
143. The "intellectual property clause" in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,
cl. 8, holds that Congress has the power to "Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts ... for limited times" (italics added). Some scholars argue that current U.S. IP
legislation (e.g. greatly extended copyright terms) bears little relation to the original
intent, which was to provide incentives for the creative or inventive process.
144. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 42 (1996).
145. Ragavan, supra note 22, at 149.
146. Id. at 150.
There is a nexus between utilitarian theory and practical policy
considerations that provides a justification for much of the developed
world's IP rights protections. IP policy can be a very powerful economic
tool when operated at the state level. A nation's IP policy vision can
lead to maximized access to crucial technology and the ability to exert
strong, though indirect, control of labor costs. Historically, some nations
adopted IP protection regimes to recruit creative capital by extending
offers of strong IP protection. 147 Many developing nations, including
India, were colonies until well into the twentieth century. 4 8  These
countries contend with high levels of poverty and essentially no middle
class. When such a country seeks membership in GATT/WTO for trade
benefits, 149 it must also accept other multilateral agreements, such as
TRIPS, and must implement an IPR regime from a vastly different
culture, that almost certainly bears no similarity to everyday norms.
Convincing their citizens that adopting a protective IP regime will
ultimately be beneficial, in spite of increased short term costs, may be all
but impossible for democratic governments in developing countries.1
5 0
In contrast, developed countries have the luxury of being able to
import creativity, via educated manpower, from other nations. This
interest in accumulating intellectual property potential lies at the heart of
many immigration policy decisions in developed nations.1 5 1 It plays a
large role in determining the overall volume of visa eligibility, and the
acceptance of special classes of immigrants, such as those with advanced
degrees. This is particularly true with respect to engineering students
and accomplished high-level scientists from military or ideological
opponents. 52 Many relevant immigration policy decisions in the United
States and elsewhere are enacted at a sub-legislative level, by administrative
agencies that are buffered from domestic and international pressures.
Developed countries can literally buy the brainpower required to help
meet various goals. There is, however, no quidpro quo for the nations
147. Id. at 122.
148. Id. at 149.
149. E.g., Most Favored Nation Treatment; TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 4.
150. See id. at 171, 180-81 (discussing the strong motivation for citizens to rally
against TRIPS in India and Argentina and the political realities facing the Indian
government's efforts to increase patent protection on drugs).
151. See, e.g., Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration
Policy Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human
Capital, 40 BRANDElS L.J. 967, 977 (2002) (illustrating the historical flexibility of U.S.
immigration policy); Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative
Look at Immigration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 99-102
(2001) (advocating formalized selection process to screen for immigrants likely to
produce significant net benefit for the United States).
152. For example, Niels Bohr, Edward Teller and Enrico Fermi were a few of the
many 6migrds to the United States involved in the Manhattan Project.
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from which these scientists migrated. The less-developed nations are
essentially powerless in this transaction, unable to provide matching
economic incentives to their most creative individuals, yet unable to
reach a more advanced economic level unless they retain these individuals.
The North-South 153 framework has provided a basis for understanding
the basic, yet emotional differences of opinion between developed, least-
developed, and developing nations concerning TRIPS. It also offers
insight into the critical interplay between China and TRIPS, and
illustrates the socio-economic issues present in efforts to increase and
modify China's position as a global trader. Increased trade has failed to
produce much benefit for the South in terms of improvements in the
most basic standard of living (life expectancy, per capita income, daily
caloric intake and medical access), when compared to the North.
15 4
In light of the acrimony and doubt felt by many developing nations
with regards to the new IP regime, flexible aspects of TRIPS were
emphasized. Some areas of sensitivity were noted as being necessary in
order to bring developing and least-developed countries comfortably
into the fold. 55 "Transparency of process" was believed to make it easier
for countries to simply make the correct choice, rather than face
domestic embarrassment.156 This was manifested in the transitional stage,
the five- or eleven-year periods available to developing or least-developed
countries to bring themselves up to standard levels.157 Technical
assistance was made available to countries such as China under Article
67, provided they moved forward (at least in the view of the developed,
decision-making nations in TRIPS) in implementing tightened IP rights
legislation.' 58 As of January 2005, initial signatories to TRIPS that took
advantage of these transitory periods are required to be fully compliant
with all components of the treaty, as the transitional periods have
lapsed,159 though newer members such as China are still in transition.
A pivotal issue with respect to TRIPS is whether countries at various
stages of development, such as China, will actually benefit from this
153. Su, supra note 78, at 196-97.
154. Id. at 196.
155. See Reichman, Compliance, supra note 7, at 368-69.
156. Id.
157. TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 65, 66.
158. Id. art. 67; Otten & Wager, supra note 14, at 410.
159. For example, India recently adopted legislation requiring its domestic
pharmaceutical industry to comply with TRIPS by January 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/l/hilbusiness/4148903.stm (last visited Jan 19, 2005).
new intellectual property rights regime.1 60 Developing countries must
take advantage of access they have been granted to developed countries'
marketplace for agricultural and textile products, and maximize their
importation of technology, the quidpro quo to their increased protection
of foreign IP rights.1 61 It is worth considering whether developed nations
would have either the wherewithal or desire to actually isolate or condemn
larger economic powers such as China for failure to ratify TRIPS. U.S.
Congressional efforts to deny China most-favored nation (MFN) status
prior to its ascension to GATT and the WTO did not succeed. 162 The
WTO recognized the non-static nature of TRIPS and the issues affecting
the international community, scheduling reviews to allow for minor
revisions. 
63
Is it possible that existing provisions are sufficient to help developing
countries become competitive trading partners, and avoid devastating
loss of domestic jobs in some of the few traditional areas of mature
industrialization? The optimistic view is that talk of doom and potentially
massive problems in China and elsewhere are simply idle conjecture,
and that TRIPS will aid in the spread of financial and social prosperity.
It is possible that a favorable economic cycle could lead to a period of
increased growth and technology transfer in the developing countries.
Unfortunately, even if this occurs, without competent business and
government decisions, it is questionable how much of an effect such
changes will have on the welfare of Chinese citizens.
What measures must be taken to increase compliance and enforcement
of domestic regulations in China? What will be the fate of the nations'
pharmaceutical industries, which have thrived for years under national
systems that did not have patents? Will that have an effect on affordability
of health care and subsequently on welfare of affected citizen? Idealists,
or perhaps optimists, have suggested that TRIPS can work for developing
nations through a concerted effort to ensure adequate technology transfer,
amidst a "non-confrontational" environment.164
The journey to the present TRIPS regime was acrimonious, as described
above. Today, in spite of the WTO's ever increasing number of contracting
parties, and the large, diverse populations that they entail, TRIPS remains
extremely unpopular with many groups. This was first highlighted in
160. Oddi, supra note 3, at 457-60.
161. Reichman, Compliance, supra note 7, at 375-76 (discussing the balancing act
between strengthened IP regulations and antitrust law).
162. Newberry, supra note 47, at 1439; TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 4.
163. Otten & Wager, supra note 14, at 413.
164. See generally Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 77 (notwithstanding
practical problems and philosophical contradictions underlying TRIPS, fair competition
might still be feasible).
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dramatic fashion in Seattle at the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference.
65
Opposition to TRIPS is strongest amongst citizens of poorer, developing
nations, 66 regardless of official governmental policies.
B. Increased Corporate Responsibility
The ideal means of alleviating welfare concerns and human rights
issues in developing countries is through a heightened level of corporate
responsibility. 167 A narrow legal basis for imposing liability on corporations
arguably exists when a foreign corporation operates as a government
agent 16 or is complicit in the illegal actions of others.
169
Practically speaking, while the concept of corporate responsibility can
apply to abusive, discretionary corporate acts, it has little nexus with
ministerial business practices of western firms. Businesses only represent
the interests of their equity investors and creditors within the confines of
the legal system. There needs to be some means of extending moral
expectations onto domestic firms that operate abroad.
Corporate activity abroad by U.S. corporations is, for the most part,
subject to minimal U.S. regulations concerning everyday business practices.
While bribing a foreign official is a punishable offense under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,' 70 everyday transactions are more likely
165. Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox of Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the
New Millenium: Universal Templates as Terms of Surrender for Non-Industrial Nations;
Piracy as an Offshoot, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 49 (2002).
166. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Least Developed
Countries, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org7_e.htm
(last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (technically, WTO nations are categorized as either "developed",
"developing", or "least-developed." Least-developed status is based on a U.N. listing.
Countries determine which of the other two categories they fall under, though this
can be challenged by other nations). See also World Trade Organization, The 10
Misunderstandings: 3. Ignores Development, available at http://www.wto.org/ english/
thewto e/whatis e/lOmis e/10m03 e.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (discussing extended
transition periods for developing and least-developed countries, as well as some
exemptions for the latter).
167. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001) (arguing that the state should not be the
sole guarantor of human rights and that treaties have ignored corporate responsibility for
too long).
168. Id. at 499-500.
169. Id. at 502.
170. See generally Richard J. Hunter et al., Legal Considerations in Foreign Direct
Investment, 28 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 851, 869 (2003) (discussing the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) under which U.S. companies and individuals can be found liable
to be regulated by foreign legislation. A pharmaceutical firm from a
developed nation that refused to sell a drug in a developing country
because it would not be able to recoup its production costs, or that
charged customers in developing countries the same amount as those in
developed countries, would grossly and negatively impact the welfare of
the people, yet would be guilty of nothing other than adhering to a strict
cost-benefit analysis.
Strong public pressure occasionally plays a role in influencing
corporate action, at seen from the negative publicity garnered by
GlaxoSmithKline.171 Other companies have subsequently followed suit,
dropping prices for their AIDS drugs as well.
1 2
However, public pressure does not always result in good corporate
behavior, even when a grave wrong has occurred. A cyanide gas leak in
1984 from Union Carbide's plant in Bhopal, India resulted in over 2,000
deaths. 173 Litigation over the incident dragged on for years in Indian and
American courts. The defendants spent years attempting to have the civil
case removed from U.S. jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
conveniens, 174 amongst other procedural defenses, before finally settling
for a fraction of the actual damages.
Extreme examples of corporate misbehavior that injure foreign
citizens such as the Bhopal disaster may be more reachable now, though
this does not necessarily portend changes to general foreign trade
practices. The recently resurrected Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")
75
provides an additional mechanism by which the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts can extend to individual actors belonging to domestic corporations
who, in concert with state actors, are responsible for committing torts on
foreign soil against foreign nationals. 176 There are other, more controversial
implications arising from ACTA; but looked at narrowly, ATCA allows
American courts to review certain foreign activities by U.S. corporations.
for bribery after offering a foreign official a payment in order to obtain or retain
business).
171. Endeshaw, supra note 165, at 50.
172. See Ragavan, supra note 22, at 176. Bristol-Myers, Merck and Roche drastically
discounted prices for AIDS medications in South Africa.
173. In re Union Carbide Corporation, 809 F.2d 195, 195-97 (2d Cir. 1987) (affg
Union Carbide appeal regarding lack of U.S. jurisdiction in part and denying it in part).
174. See Martine Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens, 26
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 949, 956 (2001) (Supreme Court uses a balancing test, assessing
public and private interests, to determine if the case should be heard in an alternative
forum).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
176. Sonia Jiminez, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Tool For Repairing Ethically
Challenged U.S. Corporations, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 721, 723 (2004).
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Anticipating ethical and moral behavior from corporations is all but
impossible without incentives and penalties. As discussed in the next
section, one motivation for corporations to take appropriate action with
respect to IP practice might lie in their desire to prevent the imposition
of compulsory licensing.
C. The Doha Declaration's Clarification of the
Role of Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is the practice by which a government issues
licenses to use a patented product without the permission of the patent
holder. Typically, this only occurs when there is a strong need for
intervention. 77 The concept of compulsory licensing is still controversial
amongst the more polarized proponents of strong IP rights. 178  Some
interesting points can be made that compulsory licensing ultimately does
not provide a net, long-term benefit for the nation imposing it. Indeed,
rational arguments can be made against its use in all but the most
exceptional of circumstances,1 79 yet barring an unforeseen increase in
corporate responsibility, any balancing of public and corporate welfare
issues ought to favor the health of the general public over corporate
profits in emergency situations.
Article 31 of TRIPS, "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right
Holder," permits compulsory licensing under limited circumstances.180
Compulsory licensing may be employed if attempts are first made to
acquire the rights to the patented product from the patent owner.
181
However, if a national emergency has occurred, this requirement may be
waived.1 82 Compulsory licensing does not represent a back-door to IP
piracy and profiteering. Article 31 makes clear its limits, holding that
compulsory licenses are not assignable, 8 3 and should be used primarily
177. Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 945 (2000).
178. Richard H. Marschall, Patents, Antitrust, and the WTO/GA77": Using TRIPS as
a Vehicle for Antitrust Harmonization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1165, 1189 (1997).
179. See Ford, supra note 177, at 953-54 (noting U.S. objections to compulsory
licenses for a litany of reasons).
180. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31.
181. Id. art. 31(a), (b).
182. Id. Compulsory licensing permitted following a failed effort to obtain
authorization from the patent holder, within a "reasonable period of time." In the event
of a national emergency or extreme urgency, this requirement can be waived.
183. Id. art. 3 1(e).
for domestic purposes.' 84 Additionally, Article 31 requires that the "right[s]
holder shall be paid adequate remuneration."
' 185
The wording of Article 31 leaves several issues open to interpretation.
No definition of an "emergency" is provided, although the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health clarified the
matter somewhat. 86  The Doha Declaration states that the TRIPS
Agreement "can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicine for all."'' 87  Each country
ultimately has the power to determine what constitutes a national
emergency.
The Doha Declaration's relaxed interpretation of compulsory licensing
standards have not been widely used yet, partly due to the pharmaceutical
industry's retreat from its aggressive posturing throughout the 1990's
and early 2000's. They have avoided confrontation and the specter of
compulsory licensing clause by heavily discounting drug prices in many
developing countries. 88 'It is difficult to predict how, or if, this equilibrium
will change in coming years, particularly if less newsworthy medical
conditions are involved.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration represents a formal review of
TRIPS, as mandated by Article 71 of TRIPS, "Review and Amendment."
TRIPS' drafters had enough foresight to recognize that TRIPS was a
living document that would need to evolve in the face of new IP issues
and sub-agreements. 189 In addition to analyzing compulsory licensing, the
Doha session resulted in the grant of an extension to least-developed
nations to come into full compliance with TRIPS. 90 Provided the Doha
Declaration is accepted as a binding agreement by TRIPS signatories, and is
therefore a binding legal commitment, compulsory licensing may alleviate
TRIPS-related health concerns in developing nations. Hopefully the Doha
Declaration will be given full faith and credit by all WTO members.' 9 1
184. Id. art. 31(f).
185. Id art. 31(h).
186. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at Qatar, 2001, WTO
Fourth Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/i (01-5859), Nov. 9-14, 2001
[hereinafter Doha TRIPS Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/ministe/min01 e/mindecl tripse.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). See TRIPS, supra
note 6, art. 71(1) (specifying that the entire agreement comes under biennial review).
187. Doha TRIPS Declaration, supra note 186. The Doha Ministerial Declaration
on TRIPS emphasizes the "flexibility" and "discretion" that nations can use in deciding
whether to take extraordinary action to protect public health.
188. See Ragavan, supra note 22, at 176.
189. GERVAIS, supra note 18, at 370.
190. Doha TRIPS Declaration, supra note 186, para. 7.
191. Peng Jiang, Fighting the AIDS Epidemic: China's Options Under the WTO
TRIPS Agreement, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 223, 237 (2002) (discussing whether Doha
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The issue of what constitutes "adequate remuneration" was not fully
addressed by TRIPS or the Doha Declaration. According to Article 31,
patent rights holders are due "adequate remuneration... taking into account
the economic value of the authorization." 192 This vague language raises
potentially troublesome issues, owing to the wide discrepancy in what the
various parties would likely consider "adequate." Market conditions
in neighboring countries with similar economic conditions should be
used to establish the market value of the. license, according to one
commentator. 193
The Chinese government frequently limits or restricts the disclosure of
information related to medical epidemics. China was highly secretive
with respect to the recent SARS epidemic, 94 which ultimately killed
thousands, and acted similarly with respect to the spread of AIDS.'95
Secrecy and national pride are not policies that should be encouraged or
tacitly condoned by the international community, yet they are a reality of
Chinese life. The Chinese need to adopt a policy that makes it easier for
affordable drugs to be distributed to the Chinese population, particularly
the majority of the population that still lives an agrarian existence. Only
a system that combines affordability with ease of access, without
requiring the central government to "lose face" by publicly admitting
that their communist paradise has healthcare problems will succeed.
One recent, highly encouraging development involved U.S. governmental
involvement and indirect subsidization of AIDS drugs in Africa. The
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has "tentatively" allowed a
South African pharmaceutical company to market a generic AIDS
cocktail) 96 Whether this is an indicator of further good will and future
represents (1) a subsequent agreement; (2) the beginning of subsequent practice showing
members interpretation of TRIPS; or (3) a "mere declaration of commitment and intent
that does not constitute an enforceable legal obligation", as this technical interpretation
could make a difference under the terms of TRIPS dispute resolution mechanism, which
restricts the use of "supplementary" materials except in situations involving ambiguity).
192. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31.
193. See GERVAIS, supra note 18, at 252 (stating that sales that could have been
achieved by the compulsory licensing party can be used as an alternative indicator of value).
194. See generally David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the
Global Age: Infectious Diseases, Bioterrorism and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 787 (2003) (pointing out the dangers involved in governmental secrecy surrounding
health epidemics such as SARS).
195. Jiang, supra note 191, at 224.
196. Donald G. McNeil Jr., A Path to Cheaper AIDS Drugs for Poor Nations, N.Y.
TIMES (online ed.), Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/26/health/
26aids.html (free subscription required) (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
social concern on the part of the United States is unclear, given the
strength of the pharmaceutical lobby. One hopes that it eases the hard
line policies of recent years.
Enhancing the welfare of individuals and increasing corporate returns
are goals that can co-exist. Avoiding excessive greed and using common
sense can lead to increased political capital for parties that aspire to be
good global citizens. Though this sounds highly idealistic, it is more a
function of long-term corporate planning with respect to international
markets. While China has a booming economy and represents a huge
marketplace for both exports and imports, it remains a heavily managed,
restricted society that is largely agrarian and under-industrialized, in
spite of the contrary images and articles in western media. With
collectivism entrenched in Chinese society, developed countries must act
responsibly and not take advantage of its marketplace and labor force to
ensure that individual rights are safeguarded.
Developed nations must ensure that citizens from countries with
weaker legal, social and economic frameworks are not forgotten in the
name of profits. While increased corporate responsibility can help ensure a
better future for the citizens of developing countries, realistically only a
firm commitment to the Doha Declaration, accompanied by a resolution
of the "reasonable price" issue, provide any solid guarantees. Productive
biennial Article 7 1(1) reviews by the TRIPS Council will be necessary in
order to achieve and maintain a balanced situation where entrepreneurial
efforts are rewarded with universally recognized patent rights amidst a
flexible framework that addresses the welfare and health concerns of
poorer representatives of the world's economic community. These 71 (1)
reviews must be seen by member nations to represent nothing less than
the intended interpretation of TRIPS, not supplementary matters.
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization promises much to both developed and less-developed
nations. Developed nations gain from their increased access to
consumers and cheaper labor markets in the less developed countries.
Developing nations enjoy benefits in the form of increased market
access, as well as the ability to import new technologies. At the same
time, the vast differences in economic, social and legal structures points
to numerous difficulties that will occur, particularly with respect to the
health and welfare of individuals in less-developed countries, if
international trade is not conducted with a large degree of restraint by
developed nations.
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The robust regulation of international intellectual property rights
serves as a valuable blocking function for savvy, western firms. First
and foremost, firms file patents internationally so that they can easily
obtain an injunction against foreign suppliers of pirated product.
Adherence to the international IP regime by poorer countries largely
serves the interests of multinationals by reducing or eliminating the
production of pirated or counterfeit products from poorer countries.
Eliminating these foreign competitors, who do not need to incorporate
huge research and development budgets into their cost structures,
provides a legitimate market opportunity for western firms. For example, if
Pfizer knows that they do not have to contend with pirated, generic
products manufactured in China and sold throughout Asia, they can
afford to expend more time and money on long-term goals in the region.
Countries on the verge of the transition from "developing" to
"developed" can use their comparatively cheaper labor costs to market
increasingly complex and expensive products and services to western
markets. If the governments of these under-developed countries take a
long-term approach, they can use portions of this economic growth to
improve their infrastructure.
Devoting time, money and manpower to better learning the nuances of
trade and IP law, would greatly help developing countries balance the
scales with developed countries. There are, of course, plenty of NGOs
that provide technical assistance to developing countries. A rarely seen
doctrine that some developing nation might someday invoke against
an inventor from a developed nation is the "reverse doctrine of
equivalents."' 97 It provides that a "major improver" of something that
has already been assigned a patent is entitled to a property right on the
improved item. In essence, there can be two competing sets of property
rights on the same object, each potentially generating licensing fees.
The crux of the matter is that such rights are not awarded for imitation;
significant improvement of an original invention is required.' 98
It is logical to link trade and IP issues, but the comprehensive nature
of TRIPS and GATT restricts negotiations and flexibilities that existed
under the previous IP regime. While nations should be encouraged to
197. Mark A Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 1008-13 (1997) (discussing the availability of the reverse doctrine
of equivalents to a significant improver who is unable to reach a reasonable agreement
with the holder of the original patent).
198. Id. at 1008-12.
comply with the current trade paradigm, as the Doha Declaration
recognizes, provisions that might well lead to adverse effects on
healthcare in developing countries should not be mandated without
implementing a thorough mechanism to protect affected citizens.
Developed nations must find it within themselves to exercise restraint
if TRIPS is to be successfully adopted in the more disadvantaged
countries without human suffering.
Admittedly, this runs contrary to all business instincts. Still, until it is
clear that trading partners such as China have adapted to some of the
harsher realities of capitalism and are looking after their citizens welfare,
developed nations must take the high road and provide support when
welfare issues occur, rather than maintaining a hard-line trade approach.
Developed nations should broadly heed the spirit of the Doha Declaration.
The use of trade sanctions and other heavy-handed tools as a means of
leveraging concessions from member nations must be restricted to limited
circumstances, such as blatant piracy.
In spite of the potential for large-scale trade battles, the United States
has not implemented major Section 301 actions towards other nations.
China has hardly been an ideal participant in the IP regime, yet it has
avoided major sanctions to date. In all likelihood, this is due to the trade
strength that China possesses, rather than a conscious effort to provide it
breathing room as it adjusts. Nevertheless, there are indications that China
is slowly coming about and embracing IP regulations. The number of
Chinese patents filed with WIPO in 2004 rose by 38% over those of the
previous year.199 Perhaps the "rampant violations of intellectual property
rights"2 °° will lessen if economic benefits to China's economy start to
trickle down to a larger subset of its population.
Positive developments in governmental policy, including pharmaceutical
responses to the AIDS crisis in under-developed countries and the Doha
interpretation of TRIPS provide some small cause for optimism regarding
the future of IP rights in international trade. These mostly reactionary
responses must be supplemented by an active commitment to incorporate
ethics and moral character into trading practices.
Amidst the ongoing U.S. disdain towards internationalism, ceding to
the wishes of the international community is politically risky, and is
likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Courage, long-range
199. See Alex Ortolani, China Moves From Piracy to Patents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7,
2005, at B4 (discussing internal pressures from the Chinese government, encouraging
Chinese firms to file first, particularly in view of China's WTO membership and the
realities of foreign competition).
200. See Murray Hebert, China Gets a Passing Grade From Foreign Firms, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at All (investment opportunities have improved, but IP protection
remains a problem in China, according to a survey of foreign companies).
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vision, and the ability to make decisions contrary to political rhetoric are
rare qualities that hopefully will be demonstrated by the leaders of
corporate and governmental entities in the developed world.
ALLAN SEGAL
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